Constraints in Kenya's information landscape by Stevens, Timothy
  
 
 
 
Constraints in Kenya’s information landscape 1 
THESIGERS | SOVEREIGN DATA VOL. 1. NO. 2 (AUGUST 2015) 
Constraints in Kenya’s information landscape 
Recent accusations of Kenyan government media repression 
suggest researchers and investors will need to exercise caution 
when sourcing data on the east African nation. 
US President Barack Obama’s visit to East Africa in July 2015 confirmed his star 
status in the region but will also have sounded alarm bells for some African leaders. 
In successive speeches Obama addressed systemic issues of poor governance and 
social injustice, messages calibrated to demonstrate government is a process of 
continual improvement rather than an end in itself. 
Obama drew attention to the crucial role of the media and civil society in the first 
address by a serving US president to the African Union. ‘When journalists are put 
behind bars for doing their jobs or activists are threatened as governments crack 
down on civil society’, said Obama, ‘then you may have democracy in name, but not 
in substance.’1  
This will have resonated with many in the region, not least Kenyans, whose 
government stands accused of fomenting a new climate of fear and censorship in 
what has for many years been a robust and resilient media environment.  
Sovereign Data looks at the Kenyan situation and explores the implications for data 
quality, media prospects, the legitimacy of the Kenyan government and the visibility 
of Kenya to the outside world. 
Kenyan media landscape 
The media landscape in Kenya is the most diverse and populous in east Africa, with 
six national daily newspapers, numerous weeklies, 120 registered radio stations and 
20 television stations.2 The state-owned Kenya Broadcasting Corporation runs two 
television stations and local and national radio services in multiple languages.3 The 
private sector is dominated by the Nation Media Group and the Standard Group, 
which together own thirteen daily and weekly newspapers, three television stations 
and three radio stations. The sector continues to expand. Standard Group, for 
example, recently announced a new multi-channel 24-hour news station, KtnNews, 
the first of its kind in east Africa.4  
Internet penetration is also increasing rapidly. The Kenya National Bureau of 
Statistics estimates there were 26.2 million internet users in 2014, roughly 59% of 
the population and significantly above the global average of 40%. These users are 
served by 185 internet service providers.5 Online news providers reach roughly one 
million users a day, a 25% increase year-on-year.6 Kenyans also access news 
media through multiple online social media platforms not captured by these 
statistics.7 Despite recent advances in digital media platforms, radio remains the 
most popular news and entertainment medium, reaching 93% of Kenyans in native 
languages, English and Kiswahili.8 
The expansion of the Kenyan media sector is rooted in post-Cold War 
democratisation and commercial deregulation. Its current rude health – relative to 
many of its neighbours – is the result of protections enshrined in the 2010 
constitution.9 Article 34 guarantees the ‘freedom and independence’ of all media and 
their employees from government interference. Adjacent articles guaranteeing 
freedom of expression and citizens’ rights to access state information reinforce 
presumptions against government media intervention. This encourages media 
diversification and emboldens those taking critical lines against the sharp practices 
of public figures and government. 
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The Kenyan government asserts the ‘media has never been freer’.10 In July 2013, 
President Uhuru Kenyatta assured editors directly of his personal commitment to 
media freedom.11 These statements distance Kenya from pre- and post-
independence experiences of media repression and from its neighbours. Ethiopia 
and Somalia, in particular, feature regularly amongst the worst offenders against 
freedom of movement and expression for journalists and their employers. 
Intimidation 
Despite the apparent robustness of the media sector and its constitutional protection, 
Kenyan media are subject to significant constraints and external pressures. 
Reporters Without Borders ranks Kenya 100th of 180 countries on its 2015 World 
Press Freedom Index (Ethiopia, by comparison, is 142nd).12 It claims Kenyan 
journalists ‘live in fear of costly lawsuits, arrests, attacks, intimidation, and even 
murder’.13 The Freedom House watchdog finds the Kenyan internet ‘free’ but its 
press only ‘partly free’.14 Immediately prior to Obama’s visit, a Committee to Protect 
Journalists (CPJ) report cited a ‘deteriorating climate’ for the Kenyan media and 
numerous examples of government media interference.15  
In 2006, the Kibaki government famously raided the offices of the Standard 
newspaper and its sister television network, KTN. Thousands of copies of the 
newspaper were burned and the television station taken off-air. Citing national 
security reasons, the government accused Standard media organisations of 
fabricating stories about government corruption.16 A decade after he described the 
raids as a ‘dark day’ for Kenya, President Kenyatta now displays this same 
authoritarian impulse, despite his rhetorical protestations to the contrary.  
As CPJ and others record, journalists are threatened with arrest and violence should 
they stray into ‘undesirable’ territory, specifically ‘national security, extrajudicial 
killings, the International Criminal Court, corruption, and land-grabbing’.17 Kenyatta 
and vice-president William Ruto were cited by the ICC for their roles in post-election 
violence in 2007-8 in which 1200 people died.18 Charges against Kenyatta were 
dropped in December 2014 but the issue remains sensitive to an administration long 
accused of corruption and other criminal activities. 
Legislation 
The principal methods of repression and control are less obvious than crude 
intimidation and coercion. In December 2013, Kenyatta pushed through parliament 
the Media Council Act and the Kenya Information and Communication (Amendment) 
Act, against a backdrop of media and civil society protest. The legislation founded a 
new government media regulator capable of levying substantial fines against entities 
breaching a new government code of media conduct. These new laws were deemed 
‘draconian’ by most observers concerned about the self-censorship required to 
avoid fines and continue operating below the level of government censure.19 One 
correspondent stated baldly before the bills’ passage that ‘no one will attempt 
investigative journalism … it is indirectly telling people not to join the profession’.20  
Two months later, the Kenyan High Court upheld media representatives’ challenge 
to the constitutionality of the acts, specifically with reference to Article 34.21 They 
remain in legislative limbo today but the CPJ notes over a dozen laws already on 
the books degrade or ride roughshod over the constitution. One particularly 
vexatious piece of legislation is the Security Laws (Amendment) Act (SLAA), signed 
into law by Kenyatta in December 2014. Among multiple measures bolstering 
counter-terrorism operations the act criminalises journalism ‘deemed to undermine 
terror investigations’. This vague definition could deter criticism of Kenya’s poor 
track record in preventing and prosecuting terrorist actions.22 The High Court again 
came to the rescue in February 2015, finding eight sections of the SLAA 
unconstitutional. This decision was welcomed by interest groups but concerns 
remain about other aspects of the SLAA infringing constitutional rights.23 Despite 
these setbacks, government enthusiasm for media repression is undimmed and 
sufficient legal methods exist to threaten journalists, however quietly, and to 
inculcate self-censorship.  
Subtle coercion 
A third opportunity to exert pressure on the media stems from media ownership 
structures and the relative influence wielded by advertisers. The CPJ alleges 
various ways in which politicians influence media organisations, although the actual 
impact on editorial policy is unclear.24 President Kenyatta holds stock in private 
media companies like Mediamax, which owns popular television station K24, and 
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former president Daniel arap Moi has interests in the Standard Group. Advertisers 
stand accused of direct editorialising, one journalist alleging leading companies like 
Safaricom, Kenya Airways and Equity Bank are effectively ‘untouchable’, an 
assertion denied strenuously by all three.25 
One example concerns the Nation Media Group (NMG), founded and majority-
owned by the Aga Khan. Since 2013, the group’s flagship publications, Daily Nation 
and Sunday Nation, have been sufficiently critical of the Kenyatta-Ruto ‘Jubilee’ 
coalition to elicit threats from the presidency that they decease or lose advertising 
revenue. In March 2015, leading cartoonist Gado left the Nation, allegedly after the 
Aga Khan met with Kenyatta in Nairobi. Neither Gato nor NMG have explained this 
abrupt departure, fuelling suspicions that government pressure on the Aga Khan 
was directly responsible.26 Given that the suspended media laws would require 
media companies to derive 45% of their advertising revenue from ‘local’ sources, 
this emerging trend may continue.27  
Outlook 
The accusations levelled at the Kenyan government and its partners remain poorly 
documented and unsubstantiated. Yet, the evidence suggests Kenyan elites utilise 
methods to pressure journalists and media companies for political ends. These 
interventions contradict the letter and spirit of the 2010 constitution and the Jubilee 
coalition’s stated commitment to press freedom. Public polling in Africa indicates 
greater freedom of expression and increased public trust in government are closely 
correlated.28 If the assessment of the Kenyan situation is correct, the government 
seems willing to risk damaging its legitimacy by degrading constitutional press 
protection. 
The same polls suggest 78% of Kenyans think their news media is ‘effective in 
revealing government mistakes and corruption’, the lowest proportion in the region, 
although not by much.29 This percentage may simply be too high for Kenyan elites 
that have avoided censure for decades by manipulating the political, legal and 
commercial landscape. It follows that government might pursue measures to 
influence the media, leveraging individuals’ economic interests, as well as 
government’s legislative and regulatory muscle.  
The Kenyan case is additionally unfortunate in that it follows an established pattern. 
Kenyan government policy since independence has prioritised short-term political 
goals over public accountability and development. The media have been complicit in 
this process as members of social elites closely intermeshed with the political.30 
Scholars identify a lack of genuine democratisation over this period and a dogged 
adherence to older patronage structures not eclipsed by multi-party politics but 
actually entrenched by it.31 
The future trajectory of government media intervention is uncertain. The situation 
will deteriorate if proposed laws enter force and harassment of journalists continues 
with impunity. The commercial influence of leading politicians affords relatively quiet 
avenues through which to protect their own interests. The wider concern with Kenya 
is that its regional dominance might bolster neighbouring countries’ existing media 
regimes, most of which are already far more corrosive by comparison.  
Kenya’s relative media exuberance has ordinarily been its best defence against 
intervention but this may be eroded if current trends continue. This will not enhance 
the regional and international legitimacy of a regime already beleaguered by 
unanswered accusations of criminality. Social media and ‘citizen journalism’ may 
partly offset the trimming of the mainstream media’s sails but few observers suggest 
this rebalancing would be altogether desirable or sufficient. 
Conclusion 
Current conditions suggest external parties may encounter problems sourcing 
accurate, reliable data from Kenyan media sources. East Africa is relatively well 
served by international outlets but global media infrastructures are often staffed by 
local personnel with invaluable local knowledge and lines of enquiry. If this situation 
is degraded, Kenya may become more opaque to foreign investors and researchers 
in need of timely and trustworthy sources of information. Kenya is far from ‘going 
dark’ in informational terms but the negative externalities of media repression are 
sufficiently well understood that its leaders would be wise to avoid any such 
eventuality. 
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Sovereign Data (or “SD”) is a monthly 
journal of politics, data and risk in 
emerging markets. Published by 
Thesigers, the research and advisory 
firm, SD is part of a larger initiative 
focused on the “know-ability” of 
information and its influence on 
political and market processes.  
Thesigers defines “sovereign” and 
“data” broadly, in order to more fully 
understand the risks and opportunities 
associated with knowledge in all its 
tributary forms – “information”, “data”, 
“evidence”, “intelligence”, and so on. 
Thesigers’ view of sovereign data is 
that it contains essential elements of 
substance and form, of context and 
meaning, akin to ‘primary sources’ in 
the very best historical scholarship: as 
original, often perishable artefacts of 
information about people, places, 
events, issues and things. 
Monthly Journal 
Thesigers’ monthly journal, Sovereign 
Data, provides short, digestible 
analysis of the state of the information 
environment. Each monthly issue 
focuses on a single, current topic 
selected by Thesigers staff, given 
additional context and assessed for 
relevance and impact.  
Reporting Service 
Thesigers’ reporting service tracks 
current developments in sovereign 
data. Intended for clients who need 
more frequent, detailed updates, the 
service features summary reports and 
briefings based on locally-sourced 
news, data analytics, risk indexes and 
regular assessment.  
Research and Development 
Thesigers conducts ongoing research 
and development through a sense-
making program of workshops, system 
design and technology innovation.  
Workshops investigate problems 
covered in our reporting and analysis. 
Our systems and technology work 
creates working solutions to them. 
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